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Abstract 
 
With a panel sample of more than 3000 rural Chinese households surveyed over 21 
years, this study estimates the evolution of relative roles of social status and human capital in 
the intrahousehold division of labor under the context of a rapid market development. With 
the guidance of a theoretical framework, it is found that: 1) market development enhanced the 
status of women, and changed the traditional rule of “women indoors and men outdoors”; 2) 
market development allocated more young labor to outward wage-earning jobs and left a 
higher share of the elderly and juvenile in land-based semi-market activities and chores, 
indicating an increasing importance of human capital over family status; 3) market 
enlargement relaxed the entrance requirements for labor market in terms of education level, 
age and height. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Since long, the intrahousehold division of labor (IHDL) has been considered as 
governed by members’ social as well as economic functions in the family’s productive and 
reproductive activities. Xenophon (1923) was probably the first to adopt this approach 2300 
years ago. He inferred that as the family plays a double role: having sons and daughters to 
support their parents in old age on the one hand, and having new treasures being most amply 
added on the other hand, God suits woman’s nature for indoors and man’s nature for outdoors.  
Economists explain IHDL by the search of increasing returns of specialization and 
division of labor on the basis of human capital, and their analyses open to incorporate social 
factors mainly through integrating altruism in the household utility function, and the 
bargaining process among household members. On their side, sociologists focus on the social 
role of household members in function of their gender and family status shaped by social 
norms. The joint determination of social and economic factors in IHDL can be generally 
observed in the real world. 
This study aims at empirically estimating how market development could shape the 
evolution of the roles of gender and family status on the one side, and of human capital on the 
other side, in IHDL. The theoretical framework that underlies empirical tests is supported by 
two pillars: 1) market development changes demand and supply-side conditions in the labor 
market. On the demand side, it reduces wage gap between men and women because most 
discriminating considerations gradually give way to efficiency criterion. On the supply side, 
along with income growth, it reduces human capital gap among family members through 
universal education, better nutrition, and improving medical care; 2) following new-
institutional economics, economic development gives rise to changes in social norms. How 
quick these changes occur, however, are subject to empirical tests.  
The originality of the work lies in its assessment of this evolution in a direct way. Two 
indirect ways of estimation are to compare the differences between urban and rural areas, and 
between the countries with different development levels. Indirect ways are facilitated by data 
availability, but present some serious limits. The direct way consists of observing the changes 
in IHDL on the basis of the same population over a rather long time in which there is striking 
market development. 
As China has experienced extraordinary long-run economic growth and market 
development since more than 40 years, on the basis of the CHNS database, we construct a 
longitudinal sample of more than 3000 households surveyed in the same villages of 9 
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provinces with a length of 21 years (1989-2009). An econometric model by Fafchamps and 
Quisumbing (2003) is adopted, and panel random-effects Tobit regressions are used to 
evaluate the evolution of IHDL in five marketable and four chore tasks.  
Strong evidence is found that rapid market development in rural China has 
meaningfully changed rural IHDL. Human capital consideration has become more prevalent. 
Market development enhanced the status of women. Women participated in more outdoor 
market activities and involved less in agricultural activities and domestic no-market works. 
Social role that was important in the past have lost ground to economic efficiency in IHDL. 
Market development allocated more young labor force to farther wage-earning jobs and left a 
higher share of the elderly and juvenile in land-based semi-market activities and household 
chores. Traditional rule of “women indoors and men outdoors” has been replaced by that of 
“the old indoors and the young outdoors” due to their differences in human capital. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the literature on how social and 
economic determinants affect IHDL and constructs a conceptual framework for econometric 
tests. Section III presents the data, and econometric model for measuring the impacts of social 
and economic variables on IHDL. Section IV analyzes the results. Finally section V concludes. 
II. Factors determining IHDL and theoretical framework for tests 
 
In a traditional society, as by economic criteria, men have higher level of human 
capital in terms of education and physical force, and by social functional criteria, women 
reproduce, both social and economic considerations drive the division of labor towards a same 
direction: women specialize in indoor and men in outdoor works. With the modernization of 
the society, especially the equalization of educational opportunities, economic and social 
criteria diverge in their impacts on IHDL.  
Sociological theories explain IHDL with reference to relative resources, time 
availability, or ideology (Shelton and Daphne 1996). Relative resource theory suggests that 
household members with the most power do the least housework since people with the most 
resources negotiate their way out of it (Hersch and Stratton, 1994). The time availability 
approach assumes that individuals are time constrained and that housework will be performed 
by the members with fewest time constraints. The ideology approach argues that those living 
in more egalitarian cultures tend to allocate time more equally to housework (Fuwa 2004). 
Bonke et al. (2008) find evidence that Danish households specialized less than American 
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households, and postulate that this cross-national difference is a result of Scandinavia’s more 
egalitarian family culture. 
Much evidence in the favor of the determination by social factors in IHDL has been 
found in developing countries where traditional family mode prevails and the market has only 
a weak effect on intrahousehold production and consumption. Seebens (2010) shows that in 
developing countries, women are embedded in a system of institutions that define rules of 
action and impose incentives, and are generally more constrained than men with regard to 
access to productive resources such as land, credit or information. Women also face 
inequalities in the labor market. Using data from Burkina Faso, Kevane and Wydick (1999) 
find that social norms significantly explained differences in patterns of time allocation 
between two ethnic groups and regulated women’s economic activities. The literature on time 
allocation in South Asia shows that to different extents, social norms, particularly patriarchy 
and the norm of female seclusion, affected time allocation (Khandker, 1988; Alderman and 
Chishti, 1991; Sultana et al. 1994, and Sathar and Desai 1996). Using data from rural Pakistan, 
Fafchamps and Quisumbing (2003) find that while IHDL was influenced by comparative 
advantage based on human capital and by long-lasting returns to learning by doing. There was 
also evidence of a separate effect of gender and family status. Households seemed to operate 
as hierarchies with sexually segregated spheres of activity. 
Above findings are in accordance with traditional rural China where the three-
generation stem family was the norm (Levy 1971). In such a family structure, the younger 
generation deferred to the elder, and women deferred to men. Parents chose a daughter-in-law 
to continue the family line and to help out with household chores (Baker 1979). Sons were 
cherished, followed by daughters. No matter how hard she worked for her husband's family, a 
daughter-in-law was considered an outsider and was kept powerless (Leslie and Korman 
1989). Since 1949, with the communist government in power and later under the effect of 
industrialization and of One-Child Policy, the large family structure has broken down in urban 
area. In rural China, traditional family structure remained dominant during Mao’s epoch.  
Economists focus on economic efficiency aspects of IHDL. As Becker (1981) put it, 
husband and wife benefit from a division of labor between market and household activities. 
The gain comes from increasing returns to investments in sector-specific human capital that 
raise productivity in either market or nonmarket sectors. Becker (1965) also states that 
biological differences are very important in explaining why women have traditionally done 
most of the child rearing. 
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To incorporate social factors, in unitary economic models, the household acts as one 
with a single preference function, and household members are either assumed to have 
homogenous preferences, or to have an altruistic household head that holds all the power 
within the household (Alderman et al. 1995). Traditional benevolent and solitary aspects of 
the family are often supported by evolutionary biologists who have developed a body of 
formal theory of the amount of altruism that can be expected to emerge among relatives in 
sexually reproducing species (Bergstrom, 1997).  
Since the late 1970s, intrahousehold collective models have appeared. They allow 
different decision makers to have different preferences, and do not require a single household 
welfare index to be interpreted as a utility function (Chiappori 1992). Those models are rooted 
in cooperative and non-cooperative game theory and pay special attention to the interaction 
among the heterogeneous preferences of household members and power distribution among 
them. The family is a place of conflict and cooperation. Collective approaches represent 
household allocations as the outcome of some specific bargaining process and apply the tools 
of cooperative game theory to this framework (Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy 1990). The 
second subclass of collective models relies on non-cooperative game theory. Men and women 
negotiate an enforceable conjugal contract before marriage. The conditionality of action 
implies that not all noncooperative models are Pareto optimal (Carter and Katz 1997).  
To summarize, whereas non-economic explanations emphasize the role of customs, 
social norms and socially defined responsibility and argue that individuals perform the tasks 
assigned to them by society according to gender and family status, economic explanations of 
IHDL focus on an effort to capture increasing returns of specialization on the ground of 
differences in human capital, while open to incorporate the social roles in their models.  
In connection with the existing literature and admitting that IHDL is shaped by both 
economic and social determinants, we set up a conceptual framework showing how market 
development may lead IHDL to be affected more by human capital consideration and less by 
gender and family status. The framework is then subject to empirical tests. 
Consider in a traditional society, a household comprises a group of men and a group of 
women, with the first more favored by social norms. If the first group has higher level of 
human capital, time allocation according to human capital or to social norms will lead to the 
same outcome. If the group of women has higher level of human capital, time allocation by 
social norms will lead to neither efficient nor equal results. This inference also applies to the 
case of the household divided into groups of the elderly and of the young.  
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Market development changes the traditional way of IHDL through affecting its social 
and economic determinants. It affects economic determinants on both demand and supply 
sides. On the demand side, first, with geographically enlarging market size, it requires greater 
mobility through asking for labor force to be able to work in far and changing places. This 
favors the young that have higher level of physical and intellectual abilities than the elderly; 
second, while in a backward economy, in accordance with low and segmented demand for 
female labor, women’s factor price is under-evaluated, with market development, wage gap 
between men and women decreases. On the supply side, along with economic development, 
growing income allows women to improve their education, nutrition and medical care, and 
thus increase their human capital relative to men. Consequently, market development 
reinforces the role of economic determinants via increasing relative prices of household 
members with lower family status. Maintaining old IHDL would be at the cost of giving up 
some potential gains for the household.  
Market development also affects social determinants. The theories of new-institutional 
economics show how changes in social-economic conditions induce institutional changes 
(Coase 1937, North 1981). In the face of increasing market demand for female labor, extra-
household environmental parameters change in the favor of women, and discrimination is 
reduced by law and by government policies. The social norm that women must stay home 
may lose ground if women are able to gain at least as much as men. How long institutional 
change is required is an open question and is subject of empirical investigation. Williamson 
(2000) has expected 100 to 1000 years for social norms to change. Our empirical tests allow 
us to have an idea not only on whether these changes occur, but also on their pace. 
There are two indirect ways of empirical estimation on the impact of market 
development on the evolution of IHDL. The first is to compare the difference between urban 
and rural areas. In urban regions, IHDL is to larger extent determined by household members’ 
endowments of human capital, while in rural area, gender and family status remain the key 
factors in IHDL. The second way is to compare the difference between countries with 
different development levels: in the less developed countries, IHDL is to larger extent 
determined by gender and by family status, whereas in more developed countries, economic 
determinants play a much more important role.  
The indirect ways are easier because data are more available, but present some serious 
limits. The difference between urban and rural areas risks being overestimated because the 
kinds of tasks assumed by urban and rural households are quite different. Unlike in 
countryside, many chores, such as cooking, washing and childcare can be satisfied by markets 
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in cities. Thus their kinds and quantities of works subject to time allocation are different. For 
the comparisons between countries with different development levels, one of the notable 
concerns is the cultural differences between them. With similar development level, 
differences in cultural context and social norm may lead to different IHDL.  
This study proposes a direct way of estimation. It consists of observing changes in 
IHDL on the basis of the same population over a rather long time. It avoids the 
inconveniences of the indirect ways. The same rural population of different periods roughly 
remained in the similar cultural context, kinds as well as quantities of works subject to time 
allocation. The real difficulty, however, is how to find the adequate data that satisfy at once 
three conditions: 1) with the same population; 2) over a rather long period; 3) with meaningful 
market development. 
III. Data and econometric modeling  
 
III.1. The sample 
The CHNS database comes from longitudinal surveys with eight waves (1989, 1991, 
1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009). The surveys cover more than 10000 individuals from 
2000 to 3000 rural households in the same villages of nine representative provinces in each 
wave.  
We collected information on 23111 observations (by household and wave) that 
reported their allocations of time. In order to get a better evaluation of the role of family 
statuses other than husband and wife, were removed the households with less than three 
members (3891 observations), those of which all members have left home (75 observations), 
and finally those merely composed of aging people and the juvenile (566 observations). A 
sample of 18579 observations from 3669 households is obtained. It is, as Table 1 shows, an 
unbalanced panel, with only one-fourth present in all eight waves. 
 
Table 1 The Percentage of Household according to Their Surveyed Frequencies 
 
Total number of 
households surveyed  
1 wave 2 
waves 
3 waves 4 waves 5 waves 6 waves 7 waves 8 waves 
3669 10.33% 9.05% 12.26% 10.49% 12.02% 7.44% 12.51% 25.89% 
Note: Calculated on the basis of the sample.  
III.2. Market development  
8 
 
We first describe market development as an environmental change, and then with this 
change as given, we are able to adopt a direct way of estimation: assessing how the 
explanatory variables reflecting social status and human capital affect IHDL over time. In 
other words, in this study, market development is not dealt with as an explanatory variable to 
estimate its effect over IHDL. 
Table 2 shows that income growth of these surveyed households was rapid in this 
period. 
 
Table 2 Per Capita Income (at constant price) and Annual Growth 
 
 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
Household sample 2550 2452 2377 2561 2896 2905 2947 2998 
Per capita annual 
income in Yuan 
2372 2389 2660 3521 4382 5561 6742 10072 
Annual growth rate  0.36% 5.52% 7.26% 7.56% 6.14% 10.11% 14.32% 
Notes: Calculated on the basis of the sample.  
Behind the constant income growth there was a profound change in income structure 
over time. The share of farming was reduced drastically, while small business (e.g., craft 
industry, commerce, restaurants, repairing, and other services) progressed steadily. Sideline 
(e.g., livestock, garden, and fishing) and salaried activities generated more than half of 
income.  
This structural change was accompanied by a profound market transition featured by 
the decrease of state and collective sectors and the increase of private enterprises. First phase 
(1978-1996) was the establishment of the household-responsibility system (HRS). Collective 
land ownership kept unchanged, peasants were contracted to explore a certain size of land 
during 30 years renewable, and the yields beyond the quota was sold in free markets at 
unregulated prices. Thrusted by this change, there was a large expansion of the township and 
village enterprises (TVEs). Between 1982 and 1988, the industrial output of TVEs grew at an 
average annual rate of 38.2% (Putterman 1997). By 1995, industrial TVEs had overtaken the 
state-owned enterprises, becoming the biggest contributor to China’s industrial production.  
The second phase (between 1997 and 2000, extendable to 2003) was marked by the 
privatization of TVES. The TVEs expansion appeared to have reached a turning point in 1997 
when the total number of firms and employment declined for the first time (Li and Rozelle 
2003). This decline was caused by the East Asia crisis (Sun 2002). In response to this decline, 
many small TVEs were transformed from collective to private ownership.  
The third phase started from 2000, and was featured by the acceleration of rural-urban 
migration. Since 2000, as major providers of a large number of manufacturing goods, Chinese 
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coastal regions had been enjoying the reputation of the “world factory”. The increase in 
demand and in wage incited more peasants to leave their villages and to work in cities. Rural-
urban migration was then tightly restrained by the Hukou system with discriminating 
conditions for rural workers on food quota, housing, medical care, child schooling, and 
employment (Young 2013). To satisfy the demand for manpower in cities, the loosening of 
restrictions on migration started in few provinces in need of migrant workers. It was until 
2014 that the difference between agricultural and nonagricultural Hukou statuses was 
definitively suppressed at the national level.  
To summarize, three phases constituted a whole process of market formation. The first 
phase partially formed land and products markets. Since then peasants were allowed to rent 
their contracted lands to the others, and to sell their products. The second phase marked the 
nascent form of capital market following the privatization of TVEs. Finally the third phase 
formed the labor market. According to the migrant worker surveys by the Chinese Statistic 
Bureau, and the Statistic Annual Yearbooks, the share of migrant workers in total rural labor 
increased from 7.14% in 1990 to 19.47% in 2000. This share reached to 30.91% in 2005 and 
to 56.17% in 2010. 
III.3. Econometric modeling 
After showing that during this period there has been a profound market development, 
this section provides an econometric model to estimate the evolution of the effects of human 
capital and social roles on IHDL over time. 
This is an adaptation of the model of Fafchamps and Quisumbing (2003). Their model 
is based on the pioneering work of Becker (1965) and Gronau (1976) that permit individuals 
to trade off domestic work, market work and leisure. A step further is taken by Kooreman and 
Kapteyn (1987) who disaggregate domestic work into many non-market activities.  
 
Household welfare is written:  
 
∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑉𝑖(𝐶𝑚
𝑖 , 𝐶𝑧
𝑖 , 𝑇𝑖 − 𝐿𝑖)𝑁𝑖=1                                                                                                                (1) 
 
 𝑉𝑖 is the utility of household member i. 𝐶𝑚
𝑖 and 𝐶𝑧
𝑖  are vectors of market and home 
produced goods.  𝑇𝑖 and 𝐿𝑖 are the total time endowment and total labor of household member 
i. The welfare weights 𝜔𝑖 are treated as exogenous to the task allocation process.  
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The household has a series of partially intertwined production activities, some of 
which yield marketable output 𝑋𝑚, others yield home goods 𝐶𝑧. Production technology of the 
household allowing for the possibility of economies of scope is: 
 
𝐺(𝑋𝑚, 𝐶𝑧 , 𝐿𝑎
∗ , 𝐾𝑙) ≥ 0                                                                                                                             (2) 
 
where 𝐿𝑎
∗  is a vectors of effective labor allocated to various task a, and 𝐾𝑙 is a vector of semi-
fixed inputs.  
Effective labor is given by: 
 
𝐿𝑎
∗ = ∑ 𝑒𝑎(𝐻𝑖)𝐿𝑎                                                           
𝑖𝑁
𝑖=1                                                                                     (3) 
 
where  𝐻𝑖  denotes a vector of human capital characteristics of i, and 𝑒𝑎(. )  is a function 
determining labor effectiveness in task 𝑎.  
The household faces a cash budget constraint: 
 
∑ 𝑝𝑚(𝐶𝑚 − 𝑋𝑚) = 𝑈                                                                                                                          𝑚 (4) 
 
where 𝑈 is unearned income.  
Maximize (1) subject to (2) and (4), plus a series of non-negativity constraint 𝐿𝑎
𝑖 > 0 
yields a series of reduced-form labor allocation functions: 
 
𝐿𝑎
𝑖 = 𝑓𝑎(𝐾𝑙, 𝑈, 𝐻1, … , 𝐻𝑁 , 𝜔1, … 𝜔𝑁)                                                                                              (5) 
 
As households differ dramatically in their composition and structure, equation (5) 
cannot be directly estimated. It is possible to estimate the determinants of total household 
labor by task, 𝐿𝑎. Summing equations (5) over all members, total labor used in task α can be 
written: 
 
𝐿𝑎 = ∑ 𝐿𝑎
𝑖𝑁
𝑖=1 = 𝐹𝑎(𝐾𝑙, 𝑈, 𝐻1, … , 𝐻𝑁 , 𝜔1, … 𝜔𝑁)                                                                        (6) 
 
Equation (6) implies a family composition and structure effect expressed in labor 
shares of different family statuses in task 𝑎 . To deal with this effect, Fafchamps and 
Quisumbing (2003) employ a convenient parameterization for household composition: 
𝑁1 + ∑ (1 + 𝛼𝑗)𝑁𝑗 ≈ 𝑁𝑒
∑ 𝛼𝑗(𝑁𝑗 𝑁⁄ )
𝐽
𝑗=2𝐽
𝑗=2                                                                                          (7) 
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J is the number of categories of family status, 𝑁𝑗  is the number of household members 
in category j (for instance son or daughter), N is total household size, and 𝛼𝑗 is a parameter 
that expresses how different category j is from the omitted category: category 1.  
If household members are equivalent in terms of labor supply, all 𝛼𝑗  are 0. -1 <𝛼𝑗<0 
means that category j counts for less than the omitted category, and vice versa if 𝛼𝑗>0. If 𝛼𝑗 = 
-1, adding a member of category j does not raise household total labor. Household 
composition effects can thus be tested through 𝛼𝑗  estimates. 
Equation (6), together with family composition effect explicitly expressed in equation 
(7) can be econometrically estimated across households of different sizes and compositions by 
replacing individual-specific variables 𝐻𝑖 and 𝜔𝑖with household summary statistics, such as 
household size, average human capital of household members, and variables reflecting family 
background that potentially affect time allocation. 
With the above considerations and some adaptations, we get following 
econometrically testable equation: 
                  𝐿𝑎𝑡 = 𝐴 + 𝛼1𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗(𝑁𝑗 𝑁)⁄ 𝑖𝑡
𝐽
𝑗=2 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=2 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑗 +
∑ 𝛼𝑘(𝐻𝑘 𝑁)⁄ 𝑖𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1 +           ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑘 + ∑ 𝛼𝑙(𝐾𝑙)𝑖𝑡
𝐿
𝑙=1 + ∑ 𝛼𝑚(𝑂𝑚)𝑖𝑡
𝑀
𝑚=1 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛿𝑝 +
𝜀𝑖𝑡                           (8) 
 
A is a constant. The second and third terms on the right hand are just the terms from 
Equation (7) in logarithm form. 𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑖𝑡 is the number of family members of household i in log 
form. ∑ 𝛼𝑗(𝑁𝑗 𝑁)⁄ 𝑖𝑡
𝐽
𝑗=2  estimate the mean effects of the member share of each family status 
category   (𝑁𝑗 𝑁)⁄ . Seven categories are distinguished: husband, wife, son, daughter, 
daughter-in-law, grandparent and grandchild. The member shares of two categories: aging 
people and child are taken as omitted category. This category includes all members belonging 
to seven family statuses but legally out of working age (>65 years or <16 years).1  
One important issue is how to estimate trend effects. To do this, a time trend variable 
is made, with wave89=0, wave91=1, …, wave09=8. Then the trend variable, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑗  for 
                                                          
1 This way of defining the omitted category has several advantages. As Table 3 will show, they were 
quantitatively important. In addition, they were observed to be active in farming, sideline and chores. 
A number of people in this category even maintained their salaried activities. Lastly, they are more 
stable in mean age, because by definition, children reaching 16 years and the passed aging people are 
at once taken off from this category. Therefore, their labor supply remained more stable over time than 
all others categories, and constitutes a good reference for comparison. 
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category j is to cross its member share with time trend.2  With the coexistence of the mean 
effect (𝛼𝑗) and trend effect (𝛽𝑗), it will be able to differentiate four cases: 1) if both effects are 
insignificant, the contribution of j is insignificant all the time; 2) if only mean effect is 
significant, it reflects the contribution of j at the starting wave; 3) if only trend effect is 
positively (negatively) significant, it indicates that the contribution of j is insignificant at the 
starting wave, and then in increase (decrease) all the time; 4) if both effects are significant, we 
judge that the contribution of j is significant in the starting wave and then changed all the time. 
 ∑ 𝛼𝑘(𝐻𝑘 𝑁)⁄ 𝑖𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1  measure the effects of several human capital variables: average 
education level, age (and squared age), and heights of male and female at legal working age 
by household and wave. They are the proxy of household’s intellectual and physical 
capabilities. ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑘 are the trend effects of them. 
 ∑ 𝛼𝑙(𝐾𝑙)𝑖𝑡
𝐿
𝑙=1  measure semi-fixed factors. Four groups of assets are identified: 
livestock, business tools, farm tools and land. 
∑ 𝛼𝑚(𝑂𝑚)𝑖𝑡
𝑀
𝑚=1  measure the effects of other factors to control for: share of members 
outside; unearned income is the sum of pension and rental; shares of pension and of rental in 
unearned income are also used as control variables. 
Finally wave and province dummies, 𝛿𝑡  and 𝛿𝑝, are for controlling time effect and 
regional inequality effect. At last, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. 
To summarize, total household labor per task (five market activities and four chores) is 
regressed on household size, seven shares of the members with same family status in total 
number of the household, variables reflecting human capital, and other control variables. The 
trend effects of the explanatory variables are also assessed.  
Following Fafchamps and Quisumbing (2003), he tests are performed using a 
longitudinal random-effects two-limit Tobit regression. As shown in the following results, the 
Rho values being fairly low suggests the appropriateness of the random- over fixed-effects 
two-limit Tobit regressions.  
IV. Results and analysis 
IV.1. Descriptive statistics  
                                                          
2 The method of using a dummy variable to interact with time trend variable to capture the evolution 
of its impact over time has been generally employed in econometric studies (Cf. Wooldridge, 2016, 
chapter 14).  
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Descriptive statistics retain valuable information. In Table 3, the average household 
size was around 4.5, indicating the breakdown of traditional large and complex family 
structure even in rural area. In general, the household composition is conditional on the 
evolution in age of different categories of family status. For instance, the increasing share of 
daughter-in-law over time was due to age increase of son.    
 
Table 3 Household Composition by Family Status and Age 
 
 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
Sample 2299 2277 2195 2259 2507 2189 2434 2429 
Household size 4.47 4.56 4.54 4.36 4.21 4.08 4.56 4.73 
By family status 
Husband 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.90 0.90 
Wife 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Son 1.13 1.16 1.15 1.11 1.03 0.96 1.07 1.11 
Daughter 0.97 1.00 0.97 0.85 0.74 0.63 0.91 0.93 
Daughter-in-law 0.10 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.22 0.26 0.34 0.38 
Grandparent 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.07 
Grandchild 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.20 0.24 0.28 0.31 0.38 
By age 
Adult_male 1.43 1.51 1.53 1.57 1.55 1.60 1.75 1.78 
Adult_female 1.47 1.59 1.60 1.61 1.59 1.61 2.00 2.08 
Aging people 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.21 0.29 0.35 
Child 1.40 1.29 1.22 0.99 0.90 0.67 0.52 0.51 
 
Notes: 1) calculated on the basis of the sample; 2) the family status is defined as the relationship 
between household members and the head of household (the husband or the wife if she is widowed); 3) 
since some categories are limited in number and their independent presence is not essential, they are 
regrouped with other categories by similarity. In general, relative to the household head, brothers and 
sisters, as well as their spouses, are younger. Brothers, sisters’ husbands, and genders are grouped with 
sons, sisters with daughters, brothers’ wives with daughters-in-law, the parents of brothers’ wives and 
of sisters’ husbands with grandparents, and finally brothers’ and sisters’ children are classified as sons 
or daughters if they are over 16 years, and as grandchildren if they are under 16 years; 4) The aging 
people are defined as those over 65 years, and child as younger than 16 years. They form the omitted 
category for the regressions. 
 
In Table 4, average land exploited by households had a slight trend of concentration. 
As agricultural activities need physical strength, age and height can be two proxies of physical 
human capital. Age increased overtime for all categories of family status. Education levels by 
family status were in progress. The young was more educated than the old, and women had 
nearly the same education level as men.  
 
Table 4 Assets by Household and Human Capital by Family Status 
 
 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
Assets 
Land (in mu) 4.77 4.77 4.77 6.43 6.56 6.41 6.16 6.22 
Farming  tools (in yuan) 240.94 479.66 540.90 1000.48 1057.20 1288.27 1284.07 1154.98 
Business tools (in yuan) 506.83 340.26 998.42 2890.63 3384.50 3507.00 3994.94 5011.74 
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Human capital 
Age_husband 41.59 43.38 44.48 45.51 46.38 48.68 51.50 53.32 
Age_wife 39.96 41.83 43.13 44.26 45.17 47.80 50.86 52.58 
Age_son 13.88 15.63 16.81 18.75 19.89 22.86 26.50 28.59 
Age_daughter 12.55 14.11 15.12 16.84 17.55 19.07 25.63 28.07 
Age_daughter-in-law 26.27 26.70 27.36 28.67 29.08 30.89 32.57 33.75 
Age_grandparent 69.56 70.04 71.17 72.18 72.31 72.49 73.67 74.60 
Age_grandchild 4.81 5.32 5.48 6.76 6.94 7.46 9.06 9.91 
Edu_husband (in year) 6.14 6.40 6.68 7.05 7.65 7.95 7.72 7.66 
Edu_wife 3.89 4.01 4.19 4.70 5.52 5.84 5.40 5.50 
Edu_son 6.02 6.48 6.93 7.12 8.07 8.33 8.66 8.73 
Edu_daughter 5.76 6.33 6.81 6.93 8.14 8.22 8.51 8.62 
Edu_daughter-in-law 7.75 8.00 8.18 8.13 8.56 8.58 8.84 8.69 
Edu_grandparent 1.10 1.20 1.39 1.50 1.91 2.52 2.52 2.32 
Edu_grandchild 3.63 3.59 5.31 3.77 5.10 4.93 5.51 6.10 
Height_husband (in meter) 1.65 1.65 1.65 1.65 1.66 1.66 1.66 1.66 
Height_wife 1.54 1.54 1.54 1.54 1.55 1.55 1.54 1.54 
Height_son 1.40 1.43 1.47 1.52 1.55 1.59 1.61 1.65 
Height_daughter 1.31 1.37 1.40 1.46 1.48 1.49 1.52 1.55 
Height_daughter-in-law 1.56 1.56 1.56 1.56 1.57 1.57 1.57 1.56 
 
Notes: 1) calculated on the basis of the sample; 2) mu is a Chinese measure unit of land and equals 
1/15 hectare; 3) edu_ by family status are measured their education years. 
 
Table 5 presents the statistics on time allocation among the categories of family status 
in farming, sideline, off-farm activities and chores. Husband and wife performed more than 80% 
of the work in farming and sideline. They were also in charge of more than 70% of chores, 
and this share decreased slightly over time.  
Whereas husband and wife reduced their off-farm activities by half, the younger 
generation (including son, daughter, and daughter-in-law) doubled their shares over the 
period. Unlike the parents, son reduced the work in farming, and increased in salaried 
activities, while kept unchanged in sideline and chores. Daughter followed the same trend of 
son, but her reduction in farming, sideline and chores were drastic, and her progress in off-
farm activities was impressive. 
Traditionally Daughter-in-law was the least favored.3 In all four types of work, her 
share, even in increase, could not lead to conclusive remarks. This is because, from Table 3, 
unlike the four categories, husband, wife, son, and daughter, which are relatively stable in 
number, daughter-in-law increased significantly, as the natural consequence of increasing 
number of son reaching the age of marriage. With the increase in share of daughter-in-law in 
the household, logically her amount of working time would also increase. 
 
Table 5 Household Allocation of Time 
 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
Farming 
Number of households declared 1433 1638 1564 1501 1481 1044 1006 959 
                                                          
3 Fafchamps and Quisumbing (2003) also conclude that in Pakistan, daughters-in-law worked harder 
than the daughters. 
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Household average (days per week) 9.40 11.80 10.98 10.50 9.04 7.78 7.53 7.56 
Share of Husband 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.37 0.40 0.41 0.40 
Share of Wife 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.43 0.42 
Share of Son 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.09 
Share of Daughter 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 
Share of Daughter-in-law 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 
Share of Grandparent 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Share of Grandchild 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Sideline 
Number of households declared 1501 1561 1444 1347 1398 1228 1275 1216 
Household average (days per week) 2.18 7.13 6.71 6.88 6.37 7.65 7.09 7.18 
Share of Husband 0.27 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.30 0.31 0.31 
Share of Wife 0.56 0.63 0.63 0.61 0.62 0.54 0.56 0.53 
Share of Son 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 
Share of Daughter 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 
Share of Daughter-in-law 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Share of Grandparent 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Share of Grandchild 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Off-farm 
Number of households declared 1190 1257 1240 1313 1549 2052 2397 2401 
Household average (days per week) 10.93 9.96 9.76 9.98 9.52 11.80 14.91 15.42 
Share of Husband 0.43  0.36  0.34  0.31       0.32    0.29    0.23    0.21  
Share of Wife   0.21    0.17    0.17       0.17       0.18      0.21     0.18    0.17    
Share of Son 0.19  0.22    0.23    0.24    0.24    0.25     0.26      0.26    
Share of Daughter 0.12  0.17 0.18  0.20  0.18  0.15  0.22  0.23 
Share of Daughter-in-law   0.05      0.07     0.06      0.07     0.07     0.08      0.09    0.09   
Share of Grandparent 0.01       0.01       0.01     0.00      0.01      0.01    0.01    0.00     
Share of Grandchild 0.00    0.00    0.00    0.01    0.01      0.01      0.02    0.03    
Chores 
Number of households declared 2268 2251 2187 2251 2493 2117 2382 2420 
Household average (hours per week) 43.04 53.71 42.75 32.83 30.44 33.85 29.50 35.64 
Share of Husband 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.15 
Share of Wife 0.63 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.63 0.56 0.56 0.52 
Share of Son 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Share of Daughter 0.12 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 
Share of Daughter-in-law 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.16 
Share of Grandparent 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Share of Grandchild 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Notes: 1) the sample is derived from CHNS surveyed rural households; 2) sideline includes livestock, 
fishing and garden. Off-farm activities include salaried activities and small business. Chores include 
cooking, washing clothes, house clearing and childcare; 3) the members declared having left home and 
worked outside are just assumed to have worked 48 hours per week in salaried activities, and did not 
participate in any other activities. They are also assumed to have spent no time on household chores; 4) 
data are missing on small business in 1989, on house clearing in 1989, 1991, 1993 and on childcare in 
1989.  
 
From these descriptive statistics, we make three observations. First, behind the fact 
that the elderly progressively reduced their activities outside household and reoriented to the 
works near or inside their households, and that the younger moved in opposite direction, 
human capital played a key role. The younger generation with higher education levels and 
with stronger physical force was more favored by labor market.  Therefore, this is a rational 
supply response to rapid increase in demand by the market in cities.  
Second, even though from descriptive statistics, we have observed meaningful changes 
in shares of working time across different family statuses among different activities, for some 
categories of family status, we cannot know whether these changes were due to time 
reallocation, or to the changes in share of them in the compositions of households. As noted, 
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daughter-in-law was the case. What we are interested is merely the time reallocation. We do 
not know whether women benefited more from the evolution of IHDL either. Their time 
evolution in chores was still less conclusive.  
Third, the change in “hardness” of work for each family status can be estimated only 
in econometric estimations. The descriptive statistics of the sample may give rise to biased 
conclusions because the effects of other variables are not controlled for. Therefore, more 
convincing results rely on the subsequent regressions.  
IV.2. Regression results 
These results on market activities and chores are presented respectively in Tables 6 
and 7. To begin with, we analyze the results on labor allocation according to family status. 
They also contain useful information on gender and human capital effects, because firstly, 
seven family statuses can be mostly regrouped according gender, and secondly, human capital 
levels are closely associated with age. Family statuses can be regrouped as the elderly (over a 
certain age, says, 50, mostly classified into grandparent, husband and wife), the young 
(between 18 to 50, and mostly classified into son, daughter and daughter-in-law), and the 
juvenile (under 18, mostly classified into grandchild). The young group has the highest level 
of human capital in terms of education and physical force, followed by the elderly, and the 
juvenile have the lowest level of human capital.  
 
Table 6 Random-effects Tobit Regressions on Market Activities 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Farming Livestock Garden Business Salaried 
activities 
Lnhousehold_size 4.978 2.545 2.017 3.612 12.862 
 (0.338)*** (0.233)*** (0.261)*** (0.463)*** (0.269)*** 
Husband 0.343 0.269 0.107 -0.156 0.517 
 (0.200)* (0.133)** (0.151) (0.355) (0.184)*** 
Wife 0.107 0.408 0.438 0.110 2.534 
 (0.215) (0.148)*** (0.164)*** (0.411) (0.214)*** 
Son 1.085 0.028 0.250 -0.043 1.145 
 (0.093)*** (0.062) (0.072)*** (0.181) (0.099)*** 
Daughter 0.886 -0.037 0.003 0.001 -0.177 
 (0.088)*** (0.060) (0.068) (0.171) (0.090)** 
Daughter-in-law 2.098 -0.097 0.078 0.528 -0.151 
 (0.278)*** (0.197) (0.227) (0.436) (0.253) 
Grandparent 0.844 -0.016 0.295 -0.292 1.050 
 (0.193)*** (0.130) (0.151)* (0.469) (0.223)*** 
Grandchild 0.114 0.599 0.146 0.752 1.001 
 (0.644) (0.437) (0.491) (0.982) (0.370)*** 
Trend_husband -0.026 -0.051 -0.019 0.045 0.028 
 (0.046) (0.031) (0.032) (0.076) (0.037) 
Trend_wife 0.133 -0.043 -0.030 0.024 -0.320 
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 (0.050)*** (0.034) (0.035) (0.085) (0.042)*** 
Trend_son -0.065 0.047 0.011 0.078 -0.009 
 (0.024)*** (0.016)*** (0.017) (0.040)* (0.021) 
Trend_daughter -0.095 0.044 0.045 0.047 0.172 
 (0.021)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.037) (0.018)*** 
Trend_daughter-in-law -0.358 -0.003 0.008 -0.046 0.250 
 (0.056)*** (0.040) (0.042) (0.083) (0.046)*** 
Trend_grandparent -0.039 0.014 0.019 0.044 -0.093 
 (0.069) (0.048) (0.050) (0.112) (0.056)* 
Trend_grandchild 0.047 -0.020 -0.004 -0.050 0.055 
 (0.115) (0.081) (0.086) (0.163) (0.065) 
Members_outside -11.120 0.389 -0.365 1.572 6.526 
 (1.060)*** (0.774) (0.822) (1.871) (0.893)*** 
Trend_member_outside 0.660 -0.617 -0.559 -1.029 0.586 
 (0.183)*** (0.135)*** (0.137)*** (0.305)*** (0.144)*** 
Edu_male -0.241 0.016 -0.071 -0.016 0.347 
 (0.044)*** (0.029) (0.034)** (0.086) (0.045)*** 
Age_male 0.034 -0.032 0.031 -0.062 0.305 
 (0.055) (0.038) (0.041) (0.098) (0.052)*** 
Height_male -0.039 -0.023 -0.006 0.016 0.127 
 (0.022)* (0.015) (0.017) (0.042) (0.024)*** 
Edu_female -0.175 -0.019 0.001 0.008 0.524 
 (0.039)*** (0.026) (0.030) (0.079) (0.042)*** 
Age_female 0.032 -0.052 -0.061 -0.012 0.056 
 (0.054) (0.038) (0.041) (0.091) (0.052) 
Height_female -0.069 -0.011 0.000 0.050 0.045 
 (0.024)*** (0.016) (0.019) (0.047) (0.027)* 
Age_sq_male -0.076 0.029 -0.038 0.042 -0.271 
 (0.065) (0.044) (0.049) (0.115) (0.059)*** 
Age_sq_female -0.093 0.095 0.018 0.083 -0.089 
 (0.064) (0.044)** (0.049) (0.100) (0.058) 
Trend_edu_male 0.021 -0.018 -0.003 -0.006 -0.057 
 (0.010)** (0.007)*** (0.007) (0.016) (0.008)*** 
Trend_edu_female 0.014 0.001 -0.015 0.020 -0.074 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)** (0.015) (0.007)*** 
Trend_age_male 0.010 0.005 0.003 0.004 -0.016 
 (0.005)** (0.003)* (0.003) (0.008) (0.004)*** 
Trend_age_female 0.000 -0.003 0.009 -0.007 -0.008 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)** (0.009) (0.004)* 
Trend_height_male 0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.023 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004)*** 
Trend_height_female 0.012 0.006 0.004 0.003 -0.009 
 (0.005)** (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.005)* 
Lnlivestock 0.065 0.146 -0.032 -0.131 -0.547 
 (0.033)** (0.028)*** (0.027) (0.055)** (0.032)*** 
Lnbusines_tools -0.021 -0.010 -0.031 0.102 0.065 
 (0.016) (0.012) (0.012)** (0.021)*** (0.014)*** 
Lnfarm_tools 0.055 0.022 0.045 -0.099 0.037 
 (0.017)*** (0.012)* (0.013)*** (0.027)*** (0.017)** 
Lnland 1.849 0.333 0.068 -0.147 -0.228 
 (0.117)*** (0.077)*** (0.089) (0.160) (0.092)** 
Lnunearned 0.033 0.049 0.057 0.190 -0.103 
 (0.076) (0.060) (0.057) (0.076)** (0.060)* 
Share_pension -1.203 -0.247 -0.366 -2.253 0.251 
 (0.736) (0.529) (0.542) (0.714)*** (0.517) 
Share_rental -0.391 -0.534 -0.815 -1.147 0.421 
 (0.670) (0.510) (0.494)* (0.665)* (0.527) 
Wave dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
Province dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant 5.018 4.151 1.888 -8.329 -30.996 
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 (2.848)* (1.834)** (2.288) (4.431)* (2.716)*** 
Number of household 2459 2455 2455 1743 3494 
Log likelihood -31364.70 -24609.56 -24609.56 -10794.09 -39598.84 
Wald chi2 3872.67 5355.90 5355.90 412.77 20812.28 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Rho 0.154 .029 .029 .183 .106 
Left-censored 
observations 
7 32 32 77 86 
Uncensored 
observations 
10355 9256 9256 3640      12886      
 
Notes: 1) the sample is derived from CHNS surveyed rural households; 2) regressions are on the basis of 
Equation (8); 3) dependent variables are measured in days per week; 4) standard errors are in parentheses; 5) * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; 6) data on small business are missing in 1989. 
 
 
Consider at first two major time allocations: farming and salaried activities in Table 6. 
In regression (1) on farming, at the starting wave, the mean coefficients were decreasingly 
ordered with daughter-in-law, son and daughter. The extents of decrease of these coefficients 
over time were also by the same order, with daughter-in-law enjoying the largest decrease. 
Grandparent and husband took a significant effort on farming, and wife increased time in 
farming over time. 
In regression (5) on salaried activities, the results are roughly the inverse of that of 
farming: While wife took the first place in term of working time at the starting wave, she 
reduced it over time. Daughter-in-law and daughter increased their time over time, whereas 
their efforts at the starting wave were not significant. Son and husband were always 
significantly present in these activities. The evolution of allocation of time in salaried 
activities was linked with the disappearance of a large number of TVEs and the emergency of 
a lot of private enterprises. The former was mostly near or within villages where the 
households lived, while the latter was mostly located near or within cities. Doubtlessly the 
young people had higher capability of mobility to satisfy this change.  
In regressions (2) and (3) on livestock and garden, wife played the first role, with 
husband and son the second role respectively. Over time, the younger generation (son and 
daughter) increased their time for recompensing the reduction of working time of their 
parents due to aging. 
In regression (4) on small business, no significant differences in level and in trend 
were observed (excepting a slight increase with son). This seems to indicate a joint 
participation by all household members. 
Turning to Table 7 on chores, in regression (1) on cooking, grandparent and wife were 
the most important participants at the starting wave, and reduced their participations over time. 
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Daughter was significant contributor and grandchild increased his contribution over time. On 
washing, daughter-in-law, daughter and son were by order the greatest contributors at the 
starting wave, whereas over time, by the same order, their contributions reduced. Wife 
increased her contribution over time. On house clearing, there was not significant division of 
labor among family statuses. At last, surprisingly, while childcare could be expected as a 
major activity of women, the absence of any family status effect indicates an equal 
contribution among family members in function of their free time. 
 
Table 7 Random-effects Tobit Regressions on Chores 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Cooking Washing House clearing Childcare 
Lnhousehold_size 8.670 4.297 2.533 18.203 
 (0.735)*** (0.223)*** (0.171)*** (2.029)*** 
Husband -0.234 -0.063 0.303 1.531 
 (0.456) (0.139) (0.209) (1.832) 
Wife 1.742 -0.098 0.014 2.356 
 (0.522)*** (0.159) (0.242) (1.949) 
Son 0.262 0.479 0.097 1.190 
 (0.232) (0.071)*** (0.114) (0.945) 
Daughter 0.571 0.575 0.123 -1.241 
 (0.223)** (0.068)*** (0.102) (1.126) 
Daughter-in-law 0.273 1.069 -0.032 2.694 
 (0.693) (0.211)*** (0.267) (1.836) 
Grandparent 2.156 -0.151 -0.176 1.764 
 (0.492)*** (0.150) (0.350) (1.586) 
Grandchild -2.051 -0.034 0.057 6.294 
 (1.022)** (0.311) (0.342) (8.659) 
Trend_husband 0.084 0.011 -0.076 -0.490 
 (0.100) (0.031) (0.039)** (0.417) 
Trend_wife -0.229 0.076 0.026 0.014 
 (0.112)** (0.034)** (0.044) (0.433) 
Trend_son -0.051 -0.070 -0.007 -0.016 
 (0.055) (0.017)*** (0.022) (0.225) 
Trend_daughter -0.058 -0.089 -0.009 0.172 
 (0.049) (0.015)*** (0.019) (0.237) 
Trend_daughter-in-law -0.090 -0.187 0.001 -0.069 
 (0.132) (0.040)*** (0.046) (0.368) 
Trend_grandparent -0.438 0.056 0.080 -0.032 
 (0.149)*** (0.046) (0.072) (0.498) 
Trend_grandchild 0.374 0.021 0.005 -1.290 
 (0.184)** (0.056) (0.058) (1.433) 
Members_outside -6.493 -7.811 1.111 -9.577 
 (2.667)** (0.816)*** (0.902) (10.478) 
Trend_member_outside -0.342 0.448 -0.700 -3.121 
 (0.434) (0.133)*** (0.138)*** (1.681)* 
Edu_male 0.067 0.082 0.121 0.421 
 (0.106) (0.032)** (0.055)** (0.338) 
Age_male 0.028 -0.024 0.049 0.126 
 (0.132) (0.040) (0.040) (0.479) 
Height_male 0.003 -0.001 0.008 0.168 
 (0.054) (0.017) (0.025) (0.164) 
Edu_female 0.348 0.088 0.001 -0.128 
 (0.096)*** (0.029)*** (0.049) (0.294) 
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Age_female 0.156 0.078 0.035 -0.840 
 (0.133) (0.041)* (0.043) (0.520) 
Height_female 0.101 -0.026 0.022 -0.181 
 (0.060)* (0.018) (0.030) (0.184) 
Age_sq_male 0.058 0.063 -0.059 -0.391 
 (0.153) (0.047) (0.039) (0.620) 
Age_sq_female -0.139 -0.025 -0.017 0.856 
 (0.152) (0.046) (0.038) (0.697) 
Trend_edu_male -0.007 -0.011 -0.011 -0.087 
 (0.021) (0.007) (0.009) (0.072) 
Trend_edu_female -0.065 -0.018 0.005 0.082 
 (0.020)*** (0.006)*** (0.008) (0.067) 
Trend_age_male -0.008 -0.001 0.004 0.018 
 (0.010) (0.003) (0.004) (0.040) 
Trend_age_female 0.001 -0.010 -0.003 0.027 
 (0.011) (0.003)*** (0.005) (0.044) 
Trend_height_male 0.002 0.001 -0.002 -0.042 
 (0.010) (0.003) (0.004) (0.033) 
Trend_height_female -0.013 0.008 -0.004 0.034 
 (0.012) (0.004)** (0.005) (0.039) 
Lnlivestock 0.279 -0.033 0.019 0.184 
 (0.076)*** (0.023) (0.008)** (0.214) 
Lnbusines_tools -0.036 -0.009 -0.018 0.011 
 (0.038) (0.012) (0.010)* (0.103) 
Lnfarm_tools 0.147 -0.001 -0.002 0.094 
 (0.043)*** (0.013) (0.059) (0.116) 
Lnland 0.486 0.061 -0.051 -0.173 
 (0.244)** (0.074) (0.036) (0.676) 
Lnunearned -0.084 -0.093 1.292 0.665 
 (0.163) (0.050)* (0.345)*** (0.515) 
Share_pension 1.336 1.121 0.747 -2.030 
 (1.412) (0.433)*** (0.319)** (4.392) 
Share_rental 0.701 0.864 2.533 -5.329 
 (1.439) (0.442)* (0.171)*** (4.508) 
Wave dummies yes yes yes yes 
Province dummies yes yes yes yes 
Constant -18.696 -4.670 -4.962 45.244 
 (6.253)*** (1.896)** (2.254)** (17.686)** 
Number of household 3621 3621 3310 1995 
Log likelihood -74117.69 -52949.85 -28273.38 -14964.32 
Wald chi2 4927.34 3727.42 1328.22 690.82 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Rho .009 .003 .022 .043 
Left-censored 
observations 
353 604 575 148 
Uncensored 
observations 
17461      17211      10693      3336      
 
Notes: 1) the sample is derived from CHNS surveyed rural households; 2) regressions are on the basis 
of Equation (8); 3) dependent variables are measured in hours per week; 4) standard errors are in 
parentheses; 5) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; 6) Data are missing 
on house clearing in 1989, 1991, 1993, and on childcare in 1989.  
 
On the base of the results of time allocation according to family statuses, we are able 
to retain some noteworthy features on this allocation by gender and human capital. 
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Firstly, on gender, Chinese IHDL has been far out of traditional mode of “women 
indoors and men outdoors”. If also considering farming and sideline as outdoor activities, wife 
was the first contributor in livestock and garden, and performed more farm and sideline work 
than husband. Daughter-in-law and daughter were also the main labor contributors in farming 
during the early period. Among indoor activities, wife and daughter were main contributors 
only in cooking, and daughter-in-law and daughter in washing in early period. Even in house 
clearing and in childcare, women were not significantly main labor providers.  
The most remarkable is that over time, the market development has oriented women 
into outdoor market activities, and freed them from indoor household chores. In salaried 
activities, wife was the first contributor at the starting wave. VTEs being near or inside 
villages, they could return home after work. Within young generation, gender difference was 
significantly lessened. While at the starting wave, the supply of labor in salaried activities by 
daughter and daughter-in-law was lower than that of son, over time, this difference 
disappeared. Their withdrawal from farming was more rapid than that of son. In traditional 
Chinese society, daughter-in-law was the least favored. This feature, still observed at the 
starting wave, changed considerably, indicating that daughter-in-law was no longer 
significantly disadvantaged by social norms. Their decrease in farming exceeded the increase 
of wife in farming, and their increase topped the decrease of wife in salaried activities, 
indicating an improvement in gender equality. The emancipation of women by market 
development was also manifested in allocation of labor in chores. In cooking, the decreasing 
role of wife was replaced by the increase of grandchild. In washing, the decrease of daughter-
in-law and daughter exceeded the increase of wife. 
In parallel with women emancipation, it can be observed also that over time, market 
development allocated the young, toward the outward and more profitable market activities, 
while grandparent (and to some extent, grandchild) towards less profitable semi-market 
activities (farming and sideline). Labor contribution of wife and grandparent were in decrease 
in salaried activities. Son, daughter and daughter-in-law were in increase in salaried activities, 
and in decrease in farming. Grandparent and wife were in increase in farming. In cooking, the 
decrease of grandparent and wife was compensated by the increase of grandchild. The labor 
contributions of son, daughter and daughter-in-law were in decrease in washing. 
Lastly, the variables reflecting human capital, especially education levels, produced 
significant effects. In general, labors with lower level of human capital were allocated in 
farming and sideline activities, and those with higher level of human capital in salaried 
activities. The effects of average education levels of male and female were both significantly 
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positive in salaried activities while they were significantly negative in farming. Contrary to 
our expectation that these effects would last and strengthen, their trends, however, were 
significantly in decrease. The same trends were observed in terms of age and height. This 
seems to indicate a relaxing entrance requirement for the labor market, as the consequence of 
the enlargement of market demand asking for a larger-number, but less qualified labor. 
V. Concluding remarks 
 
In this study, a sample of Chinese rural households surveyed over 21 years was 
constructed to estimate whether market development led the intrahousehold allocation of time 
to be influenced more by human capital consideration and less by gender and family status. 
Strong evidence has been found that rapid market development in rural China has 
meaningfully changed rural IHDL. Human capital consideration has become more prevalent. 
Social roles that were important in the past have lost ground to efficiency. On the basis of 
education level and physical force, household members with less favored family statuses 
improved their positions. Gender discrimination was widely reduced. Over time, more female 
labors were allocated into outside household and profitable market activities, and less in 
farming and sideline works, and in chores. Market development also allocated more young 
labor into outward-oriented market activities, and the elderly into land-linked works and 
chores. Juvenile labors were also observed to be charged more inward household works. The 
traditional rule of “women indoors and men outdoors” has been replaced by that of “the old 
indoors and the young outdoors”. Lastly, a gradual relaxation of entrance requirements for the 
labor market in terms of education level, age and height was observed as the consequence of 
market development. 
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